

Nuclear Control in NATO

by Robert E. Osgood

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

Arnold Wolfers, Director

Affiliated with

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION

COPYRIGHT 1962

by

The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research

Printed in United States of America


Nuclear Control in NATO

by Robert E. Osgood

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

1906 Florida Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Arnold Wolfers, Director



NUCLEAR CONTROL IN NATO

Robert E. Osgood

1. The Recent History of Nuclear Sharing

No contemporary military problem illustrates more poignantly the political ramifications of military policies than the problem of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. Indeed, on strictly military grounds few now argue that America's virtual monopoly of nuclear control poses any problem at all, since American spokesmen have now publicly revealed that the United States has an immense nuclear arsenal that is more than adequate for making nuclear attacks on her and her allies unprofitable, and since the vast technical and economic demands of building a nuclear force that could reasonably be used independently of the United States arsenal are more clearly than ever beyond the capacity of any ally or group of allies to meet in the foreseeable future. The control of nuclear weapons in NATO constitutes a serious problem for political reasons, most directly, and for military reasons only indirectly. For it is principally a problem of sustaining mutual confidence among allies, of accommodating vital interests, and of satisfying demands of national equity and pride -- of achieving these political ends, essential to the cohesion of the alliance, by adjusting the terms of military collaboration.

The problems of nuclear control and, in particular, "nuclear sharing" have been growing steadily more urgent since October, 1957, when the Russians orbited the first earth satellites, although their earliest manifestations appeared after the American and Soviet thermonuclear explosions of 1953 and NATO's commitment to a tactical nuclear strategy in 1954. In December, 1957, the United States, anxious to counteract a possible

Soviet advantage in future missile strength, got the North Atlantic Council to agree "in principle" to placing missiles on allied soil. Part of the bargain was that these missiles should be under bilateral operation and SACEUR command in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated by the United States with her allies. The warheads, however, would remain under custody of American troops and under the exclusive authority of the American President to release them for use, as prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act. Only Italy and Turkey received IRBM's on their soil under such bilateral agreements (the United States placed IRBM's in Britain under a special "two-key" system outside SACEUR command). France flatly refused to accept nuclear warheads that were not under her physical control. And the American government soon dropped the project of dispersing the vulnerable, slow-firing, liquid-fuel Thors and Jupiters.

Nevertheless, when the solid-fuel Polaris began to become available, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Norstad, proposed a much more extensive form of sharing the control of nuclear weapons. In August, 1959, he proposed reassuring our European allies that nuclear weapons would be available for their defense by making NATO itself the "fourth nuclear power." Subsequently, he indicated that he had in mind the multinational operation of mobile, land-based Polaris and other nuclear weapons. These weapons, he said, were needed to replace obsolescent aircraft in order to meet the future tactical requirements for the defense of Europe, including long-range (1200 miles or more) strikes -- requirements which he evidently felt were needed to support a full-scale tactical nuclear war waged as an integral part of a strategic nuclear war. In the fall of 1960 Secretary-General Spaak and Chancellor Adenauer joined Norstad in promoting this general

plan. At the December meeting of the ministerial council in Paris Secretary of State Herter, responding to this pressure, endorsed the "concept" of a NATO-controlled nuclear force. This force, however, would utilize seaborne Polaris and would be contingent upon the allies agreeing on a "multilateral system" of political control, which is a condition that the allies are surely unable to meet without the most forceful American assistance (only the West German government produced any plan for a multilateral system of control, but no other ally supported it).

The Kennedy administration, although initially dissociating itself from this tentative endorsement of a NATO nuclear force, found it prudent to restate the American interest in broadening allied participation in nuclear control. At Ottawa, on May 17, 1961, President Kennedy told the Canadian parliament that the United States looked forward to "the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile force which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved." On November 17, following Chancellor Adenauer's statement that NATO should be able to order the use of atomic weapons without prior authorization of the President of the United States, Secretary Rusk told a press conference that the Ottawa offer still stood, provided the allies would agree upon the organization and guidelines for the control and use of a NATO nuclear force.

After the administration thus cautiously opened the door to nuclear sharing a bit wider, there was a marked intensification of pressure to act on the invitation, with German defense minister Strauss, General Norstad, and NATO Secretary-General Stikker in the vanguard, proposing a variety of plans. With

the early May, 1962, meeting in Athens of allied defense and foreign ministers on the near horizon, the whole issue of nuclear control for the first time reached the stage of concerted, detailed planning in the American government and active exploration and discussion within the alliance.

Measured against all the ferment, all the studies and plans, excited by this issue in the months before May, the announced results of the May meeting were a distinct anti-climax. The United States "committed" five Polaris submarines to NATO, but under complete American operation, command, and political control. The alliance agreed to "special procedures" for exchanging information and consulting about the composition, deployment, and use of American-controlled nuclear weapons. And once more the United States gave "firm assurances" that her strategic nuclear forces would "continue to provide defense against threats to the alliance beyond the capability of NATO-committed forces to deal with." Indeed, the principal achievement of the meeting as hailed in the press accounts, was Secretary of Defense McNamara's success in convincing America's allies that her nuclear weapons are adequate to defend them and that, therefore, there is no sense in their going to all the trouble of seeking an agreement to share the control of nuclear weapons, much less trying to build their own.

Yet the whole history of the persistent issue of nuclear control and sharing indicated that it could not so easily be laid to rest. Even if the problem were only to bolster confidence in America's control of nuclear weapons -- as in the short run it might well be -- the need for bolstering confidence arose from divergent non-military as well as military interests which were not likely to be satisfied for long by the gestures and reaffirmations of the May meeting.

2. Basic Sources of the Problem of Nuclear Control

Pressure for mitigating America's virtual monopoly of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO was bound to come to a head sooner or later, if only because the original military basis of allied security, America's monopoly of nuclear striking power in the world, was bound to fade away. NATO is, after all, a coalition of sovereign states, which display the propensity of all states to seek control over their military destiny. Moreover, their sense of sovereignty has been sharpened by their striking economic resurgence and cooperation, which has relieved them of a critical dependence upon American aid in the aftermath of World War II and even provided them with some economic leverage against the United States. Yet, while the European allies seek control over their military destiny, the growth of Soviet nuclear power, by making them terribly and inescapably vulnerable to obliteration, has rendered their very survival dependent on the United States nuclear weapons. At the same time, by making the United States herself subject to serious devastation, the growth of Soviet nuclear power has raised serious doubts about the willingness of the American government to exercise her control in a manner compatible with their vital interests -- a situation that assumes special political significance because the allies are by no means agreed upon how to support their vital interests in the face of Soviet pressure on Berlin.

Yet, although the original military basis of allied security was bound to fade away and pressure for a mitigation of America's exclusive control of nuclear weapons was bound to arise, the disruptive effects of American control as well as the pressure for mitigating it have been exacerbated by the nature of NATO's military strategy and capabilities, which were by no means inevitable. For the inordinate

dependence of all the allies upon countering a conventional aggression with nuclear weapons -- which is the direct result of the American and British "new look" defense policies of 1953 and NATO's adoption of a tactical nuclear strategy in December of 1954 -- has compounded the difficulty of sovereign states, with divergent as well as common interests, entrusting each other or any one of them with the power to use or threaten to use this terrible force. So whether or not the allies' heavy dependence on nuclear warfare while Russia has acquired the capacity to devastate any or all of them has encouraged the Soviet government to take larger risks of conventional conflict, it has certainly strained their political cohesion -- that is, their capacity to concert policies that may have to be supported, in the last resort, by war -- in the face of Khrushchev's calculated exploitation of alternately hostile and conciliatory gestures to play upon Western fears of nuclear catastrophe.

This strain upon allied cohesion is intensified by another development, which reflects an allied desire to overcome America's nuclear monopoly and which is stimulated by the rise of Soviet nuclear power and NATO's nuclear dependence, as well as by the inexorable spread of technology: France's and Britain's efforts to build their own nuclear weapons. These efforts to create two more independently-controlled nuclear forces in the alliance complicate the problem of maintaining mutual confidence in the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons, since, to the extent the efforts succeed, they will increase the number of unilateral national decisions that could be disastrous for all. If the contagion of independent nuclear efforts were to spread, if a number of allies were determined and able to produce their own nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the whole political foundation of military and diplomatic collaboration in the West might be undermined. Most

important, the United States might feel compelled to openly hedge her obligation to spring to the defense of Europe, lest her nuclear allies trigger her into a holocaust against her will. For each nuclear nation might precipitate a nuclear war; yet none would really be able to employ its relatively small force independently and none could restrain or coerce the Soviet Union without American support. Furthermore, the multiplication of separate nuclear forces would run directly counter to the American policy of limiting and controlling nuclear warfare through integrated targeting, intelligence, communications, and command.

Even the present British and French nuclear efforts have a corrosive effect upon allied cohesion. For one thing, they raise fears that West Germany will seek membership in the nuclear club, if only by the subterfuge of gaining a share in the control of the decision to use America's nuclear weapons. Yet as long as the Federal Republic is barred from joining the club by domestic and international opposition, as well as by the terms of the WEU treaty making her a participant in NATO, the British and especially the French nuclear efforts are bound to rankle a power that feels entitled to equal status and is in a good position to demand it.

The French and British nuclear efforts, moreover, divert valuable resources away from the most pressing requirements of common defense -- particularly the buildup of conventional forces -- into extremely expensive independent military programs, which, considering the vulnerability of Europe to nuclear obliteration and the immense technical requirements of a useful nuclear retaliatory force, cannot really enable these powers to meet Soviet threats with more credible counterthreats or, if deterrence should fail, with more effective force than the United States would employ in their behalf. Furthermore,

these independent nuclear efforts encourage even the non-nuclear allies to sustain the illusion, fostered by the United States throughout the 1950's, that the capacity to inflict nuclear reprisals is a satisfactory substitute for the capacity of conventional resistance; and, therefore, they impede the adjustment to military realities, which the United States is now belatedly urging.

A movement toward independent nuclear forces within the alliance might have occurred in any event, considering the spread of nuclear technology and the powerful appeal of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national greatness and instrument of diplomatic influence. But this movement has also been motivated by compelling considerations of military security. It has therefore been accelerated and its political and military consequences exacerbated by the nature of NATO's strategy and capabilities, which have left the allies overly dependent on an American choice to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in their defense in default of a common effort, well within allied material and economic capacity, to build forces that could cope conventionally with a sizable conventional aggression. For when security depends so heavily on the power to meet an attack with nuclear weapons, one must expect that those nations who can develop a nuclear force will seek their own, if it is the only alternative to depending entirely upon the United States force. Yet the same dependence on nuclear deterrence that increases the reluctance of some allies to rely entirely on America's nuclear force makes all allies even more reluctant to rely on several or even one non-American finger on a nuclear trigger.

The resulting problem of nuclear control compounds the difficulty of confronting the Russians with a unified policy in the center of Europe. For a viable policy requires the ultimate sanction of a willingness

to support it with force. Allied agreement on policy, in turn, requires allied agreement on the contingencies and methods of using and threatening to use force. The inordinate dependence of all the allies upon a nuclear response to counter a wide range of possible military threats to their interests compounds the difficulty of their agreeing upon a policy to express these interests. The American monopoly of the control of nuclear weapons places the burden of achieving a policy consensus overwhelmingly on the United States, but allied uneasiness about America's strategy of using and threatening to use these weapons impedes American efforts to achieve a more flexible military posture and diverts American energies into allaying the anxieties that spring from the existing posture.

The control of nuclear weapons has other disturbing political ramifications that go to the heart of NATO's cohesion and, indeed, America's whole relation to Europe. The issue is deeply entangled in the mounting friction of national ambitions and interests among the allies. De Gaulle regards France's nuclear program as a prerequisite to becoming pre-eminent in a European entente that would be less dependent on American military and political leadership. He resents America's refusal to help France become a nuclear power while she gives preferential nuclear assistance to Britain. The friction resulting from this nuclear discrimination is not allayed by Britain's effort to join the Common Market on terms favorable to her special interests outside Europe and unfavorable to de Gaulle's notion of a restricted economic grouping that would be the foundation of a separate political grouping or "Third Force." It would not be surprising if de Gaulle should try to connect the resolution of this economic-political issue with the resolution of the nuclear issue, perhaps by making British nuclear assistance the condition of accepting

Britain's terms of membership in the Common Market -- a maneuver that would be disrupting whether the British rejected it or not. The British, on the other hand, are determined to preserve their special political relationship with the United States, of which their own nuclear effort is both a symbol and an instrument; and they are opposed to participating in any separate European military or political grouping, especially one revolving around a Franco-German axis, although they might on some conditions prefer to join such a group rather than face the consequences of being excluded. The West German government resents both the French and British independent nuclear efforts, which relegate the Federal Republic to a subordinate status. As a means of getting parity it seeks a larger share of the control of America's nuclear weapons within a NATO nuclear force to which national nuclear forces would be subordinated, but neither Britain nor France is willing to cooperate. Although West German leaders prefer a close relationship to the United States within an integrated alliance, they also value their rapprochement with France, which gives them unqualified support in opposing Britain's "flexible" approach to the Soviet Union in the Berlin crisis.

Hence, allied relations are always subject to being split between a Franco-German and an Anglo-American military-political axis. France and Germany may in any case, exploit this possibility: France, to undermine the special Anglo-American relationship; Germany, to keep the Americans aware that she has a political alternative if the United States does not adequately support her interests against the Russians. Alternatively, there is a possibility of a European political and economic grouping built upon the Common Market countries and, within it, an Anglo-French-German nuclear core. From the American standpoint this group would be greatly

preferable to either a Franco-German nuclear axis or to entirely separate French, British, and German nuclear forces. It may yet become the best available instrument for resolving the nuclear-political tangle in the alliance. It would nevertheless be difficult to reconcile with the military and political interests that the United States is now trying to pursue within the framework of an integrated NATO, her general support of European unity in the Common Market notwithstanding.

Thus the control of nuclear weapons has become a political football in the increasingly active competition of divergent allied interests. As such, it is a cause as well as a result of allied political friction. It brings to a head the most fundamental questions of American foreign policy.

3. German Fears and Ambitions

For these reasons the control of nuclear weapons, which, given a virtual American nuclear monopoly in the alliance during the period of rising Soviet nuclear power, was bound to become an issue sooner or later, became a serious military and potentially disruptive political problem. But in 1962 the particular urgency that some members and advisers of the American government attached to mitigating the effects of the American monopoly was primarily the result of German pressure springing from developments in 1961.

One of these developments was the intensification of the Berlin crisis, which emphasized Germany's front-line position in the cold and potentially hot war in Europe and thereby heightened her anxiety to receive assurances of allied political and military support while enhancing her influence in determining the nature of this support. This development occurred

concurrently with the Kennedy administration's effort to revise American and NATO strategy so as to relieve the alliance of some of the political and military liabilities of nuclear dependence -- to give the West, as the President put it, "a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action" -- by building up its capacity to contain a conventional aggression with conventional arms. This strategic revision, in conjunction with the Berlin crisis, raised fears in the German government that the United States would undermine the credibility of the nuclear strategy upon which Germany depended and to which she still adhered when it was imperative to restrain the Russians with the threat of nuclear retaliation.

The resulting loss of confidence in America's will to use or at least threaten to use nuclear weapons against a conventional aggression stimulated a renewal of German proposals for a share in the decision to use nuclear weapons, preferably under NATO's authority and independent of the American President's authority. From Germany's standpoint, nuclear decision-sharing under NATO's multinational auspices was the only politically feasible equivalent of an independent nuclear force. Yet the prospect of German decision-sharing was bound to disturb other allies. Consider the strong opposition in England even to giving German forces nuclear weapons when the United States would keep custody of the warheads and release them only on Presidential authorization. Hence, German proposals for decision-sharing seemed to some like dangerous devices to give Germany under NATO's auspices an almost-independent nuclear capability, which she was constrained from seeking by the British and French method.

The urgency of responding to German pressure for nuclear decision-sharing was enhanced by Germany's associating it with the NATO military

requirement, formulated by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Norstad, and approved as a matter of course by the North Atlantic Council, for numerous MRBM's to replace obsolescent bombers in order to maintain NATO's capability to fight a full-scale tactical nuclear war under SACEUR's command. The German government's stress on this stated military requirement, in conjunction with its proposal to place the MRBM's under joint control, seemed to reflect misgivings that the United States, especially under its revised strategy, would become increasingly less dependent on nuclear forces committed primarily to the defense of Europe and more reliant upon Polaris and SAC forces outside Europe -- forces which would respond primarily to purely American needs and which Germany could not bring under even the measure of surveillance that her participation in SHAPE planning afforded her over the nuclear forces assigned to SACEUR.

4. The Importance of Strategic Consensus

It was in this context of general conditions and particular circumstances that the American government in 1962 set about seriously appraising the organization of the control of nuclear weapons. In doing so, it was important that the government recognize the basic sources of the problem of nuclear control in order that it should correctly estimate what could and could not be accomplished by organizational means.

Ever since NATO's adoption in 1954 of a strategy authorizing the military to plan on countering a conventional attack with the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, nuclear sharing, in one form or another, has been presented as a remedy for the political difficulties attending America's virtual monopoly of nuclear control in the alliance. At first,

it was merely a matter of amending the Atomic Energy Act to permit information on the operational characteristics of nuclear weapons in order to retain the morale of allied forces which were dependent upon them. Later, some advocated sharing the decision to use nuclear weapons in order to give the allies more control over their destiny by means of an alternative to independent nuclear efforts.

Yet if the above analysis is correct, nuclear sharing will not necessarily ameliorate the problems surrounding the existing system of nuclear control, since these problems do not spring simply from America's nuclear monopoly in the alliance. Apart from their exacerbation by the political differences among the allies, these problems are primarily the product of a lack of confidence on the part of some of the allies that the United States would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in a manner compatible with their vital interests and, secondarily, the product of the spread and prospective spread of independent nuclear efforts, which is partly a result of this lack of confidence. But this lack of confidence is, in turn, exacerbated by the great dependence of NATO upon countering conventional aggression with nuclear weapons, which is a direct product of NATO's strategy and capabilities. Therefore, the fundamental remedy for the political problems of nuclear control cannot be found simply in a reorganization of control; it depends, in the first instance, on a firmer allied consensus on military policies, based upon a revision of NATO's military strategy and capabilities. This is primarily a task of persuasion, pressure, and the accommodation of national interests on the highest political level -- a task inextricably entangled with interallied diplomacy.

Under the existing circumstances, sharing nuclear responsibilities more broadly would not

necessarily enhance the cohesion and security of NATO. Indeed, there is a danger of its producing just the opposite effect by extending participation beyond the limits of military and political consensus, just as extending diplomatic consultation may intensify political differences when there is an insufficient convergence of national interests. On the other hand, given tangible progress toward achieving a strategic consensus and revision, supported by the required conventional arms and forces, some measures of multilateral nuclear sharing might substantially ameliorate the problems of nuclear control and even facilitate the achievement of a strategic consensus and revision. In any case, one cannot sensibly consider methods of organizing the control of nuclear weapons apart from the nature of the strategy for using them.

Since nuclear control and strategy are integrally related, I shall first briefly state the strategic guidelines which, in my opinion, ought to govern the use of nuclear weapons and then consider the best methods of sharing nuclear responsibilities more broadly.

5. A Nuclear Strategy for NATO

As the Kennedy administration has emphasized, the first strategic guideline ought to be to reserve the threat of initiating the use of nuclear weapons as an ultimate resort in the event that allied forces are being overwhelmed in a full-scale conventional assault by Soviet or Soviet bloc forces. There is no material obstacle to prevent the allies from meeting this requirement by creating forces capable of withstanding the largest assault the Soviet Union is presently able to deploy without substantial mobilization. Thirty or forty combat-ready divisions on the front line might be sufficient. But an adequate conventional force depends not only on a sufficient number of

divisions but also on a sufficient quantity of modern conventional arms and on battlefield strategies and tactics -- supported by appropriate training and organization -- which are geared primarily to fighting conventional warfare.

Such a force would strengthen overall deterrence by enhancing the credibility of effective military responses to a wide range of possible forms of aggression. But military policies must also be designed to meet the possible failure of deterrence. If nuclear weapons must therefore be used, either against a conventional or a nuclear attack, how should they be used? Again the Kennedy administration's view seems prudent and even indispensable: so far as possible, nuclear weapons must be used in a selective, discriminating, and politically controlled way, so as to maximize the chance of limiting civil destruction and terminating the conflict without catastrophe or capitulation. Undoubtedly, it would be extremely difficult, even under the most favorable circumstances, to fight a controlled or graduated nuclear war; but, considering the consequences of an uncontrolled and unlimited nuclear war, one cannot afford to foreclose that opportunity by default.

This means that nuclear weapons must be used according to a strategy of controlled risk; that is, they should be used not as more powerful TNT weapons designed to disarm the enemy, to overwhelm his military forces -- there could be no sensible limits to the destructiveness of such a war -- but rather as a means of demonstrating the will to raise the level of violence and therefore, inevitably, the risk of general war in order to terminate the war by a negotiated truce or settlement. This will should be demonstrated, in the first instance, by striking at targets which serve a military purpose and which

are unrelated, so far as possible, to civil destruction. The overriding purpose should be to terminate the war politically before it degenerates into an all-out counterforce exchange, which would quickly become indistinguishable from a war of unlimited destruction.

The question remains whether the counterforce targets ought to be primarily Soviet long-range nuclear striking power, including missiles located on Soviet territory -- in which case one would try to fight a controlled strategic nuclear war -- or primarily important shorter-range air and missile bases, communications and command centers, and the like outside Soviet territory -- in which case one would try to fight a local nuclear war to exert a military effect on the battlefield. Probably neither strategic option is likely to be militarily useful if carried to its ultimate extreme rather than employed as an instrument of bargaining and negotiation; but since Soviet pronouncements deny the possibility of fighting any kind of limited nuclear war and Soviet military policies apparently support this denial, one must concede that neither option is likely to be feasible as a political instrument either. All that one can say is that the geographically restricted "tactical" nuclear war seems to be the least infeasible option, since it is compatible with an observable distinction between theater warfare and nuclear exchanges involving the Soviet and American homelands. To be sure, this option is likely to be unpalatable to the allies in the prospective nuclear battle zone, whom the Russians might induce to bargain out of a war in which their homelands would seem to be expendable hostages while the United States and the Soviet Union escaped nuclear devastation. On the other hand, these allies have no less objectionable alternative. They cannot reasonably count on a purely intercontinental nuclear exchange sparing their homelands either. They, like

the United States, should logically prefer the strategy with the greatest chance of culminating in an honorable negotiated peace short of catastrophic destruction. On this ground, a strategy of restricted, local, counterforce strikes -- if nuclear weapons must be used -- is in the best interest of all the allies.

If the Soviet Union should use nuclear weapons first, the proper response would be somewhat easier to determine than if the West used them against Soviet conventional aggression. The West should then respond in a proportionate fashion, meeting limited blows with limited counterblows. If it were patently clear that the Russians had launched an unlimited counterforce or countercity war, the West would have no military choice but to respond in kind; but, as a general rule, the West should not be the first to strike primarily at civilian populations or to undertake a war of unlimited counterforce destruction.

It follows from these strategic guidelines that there is a premium on holding effective political control over initiating the use of nuclear weapons and over employing nuclear weapons in combat. This has important consequences for the kind of nuclear weapons systems the West needs. It means that the West must have a limited counterforce capability in addition to a countercity capability designed merely to inflict unacceptable civil destruction -- a requirement that is amply met by the present American arsenal. This counterforce capability requires nuclear weapons of great accuracy and low yield as well as the medium-and-long-range missiles carrying megaton warheads. It is equally important that these weapons be sufficiently invulnerable to attack to survive Soviet nuclear strikes without being launched upon the earliest warning or even upon the initial blows of the attack -- a requirement that means not only that the European-based bombers

must be made more secure than at present but also that the nuclear forces designed to strike targets that pose a strategic threat to Europe must be based largely outside the Continent. Finally, all nuclear weapons must be targeted, deployed, and used according to integrated plans, intelligence, and communications.

Effective political control and operational command will be impeded to the extent that nuclear weapons are located in forward areas, where they are likely to be threatened with rapid overrunning, or widely dispersed throughout military units and commands, where they will be difficult to coordinate. Eventually, if conventional capabilities should enable the alliance virtually to rule out initiating the use of nuclear weapons, the chances of controlling nuclear warfare might be further improved by operating all nuclear weapons in special nuclear units, separate from but coordinated with the conventional units, instead of relying on "dual-capability" weapons, which now complicate the training and planning duties of line commanders.

Against such measures as these one can argue that a nuclear strategy, capability, deployment, and command arrangement that enhances nuclear control will also reduce the risk in Soviet eyes of a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear war and so make more likely conventional probes and attacks; but if the alliance has adequate conventional forces, reducing the risk to Russia of tripping off an unauthorized nuclear war will not constitute a net disadvantage.

Given a suitable strategy and capability to counter conventional aggressions in Europe without resorting to nuclear war, NATO's nuclear needs will be far less than those called for by an all-out counterforce

strategy designed to disarm the enemy. In the future, if not now, that would be a futile strategy that could only accelerate the arms race unnecessarily. The counterforce capabilities required may initially call for some land-based nuclear weapons, but probably the functions of these weapons can be progressively performed by missiles -- especially seaborne missiles -- outside Europe. Seaborne missiles have the advantage not only of being difficult for the enemy to locate but also of avoiding the domestic political and psychological repercussions of land-based missiles, which are visible to the apprehensive citizenry and which threaten to draw enemy fire to the homeland.

If the American government secures a definite consensus on nuclear strategy among its own armed services and civilian organs, it will be in a position to take up the matter of nuclear control and sharing with its allies more profitably, by drawing a clear distinction between strictly military and purely political requirements in the types, numbers, and deployment of nuclear weapons.

6. The Components of Nuclear Control

What system for controlling nuclear weapons in the alliance would help strengthen NATO's political cohesion and facilitate the achievement of a strategic consensus based on the kind of military strategy and capability I have outlined?

The growth of Soviet nuclear power, the fateful nature of nuclear warfare, and the economic resurgence and political self-assertiveness of the European allies require that the existing system be altered to give the allies a broader participation in the control of nuclear weapons. A broader participation is equally required by their need for self-education in the facts and responsibilities of nuclear strategy, a

process that is inevitably impeded by dependence upon America's management of nuclear responsibilities and by a resulting lack of information and influence in this area. It becomes increasingly doubtful that American threats, concessions, bargaining, and cajolery can achieve the major revision of allied strategy and capabilities that is needed if the crucial decisions remain so largely an American prerogative. Rather, the allies themselves must become more deeply implicated in the concrete tasks of military security.

Yet, as Alastair Buchan pointed out in the January, 1962, issue of Foreign Affairs, nuclear control and, hence, the sharing of nuclear control, can mean different things, since there are different kinds of activities governing and supporting the use of nuclear weapons which are subject to control. Sharing some of these activities more broadly might advance allied cohesion and security; sharing others might either reduce allied cohesion and security or have no effect at all. One might speak of these several nuclear activities as the components of control.

The principal components are these: manufacture of weapons; ownership of weapons; custody of warheads; manning and operation of weapons; military command of weapons; planning the strategy for using nuclear weapons (their number, type, and deployment and the contingencies, methods and targets of their employment); the political decision to use or not use nuclear weapons; the political decisions to govern the use of nuclear weapons in combat. Allies can share actual participation in these activities, or they can simply share information and consult about them; both kinds of sharing could provide them with some assurance that their vital interests were safeguarded. In addition, allies can share these activities independently or jointly. I shall consider here only forms of joint

sharing, because I am assuming that the diffusion of independent control works against the cohesion and security of all allies.

Allied participation with the United States in controlling either of the first three components -- manufacture, ownership, and custody -- would be tantamount to creating independently-controlled nuclear capabilities, which is a prospect that already jeopardizes NATO's political cohesion. Even if these components were shared with the allies jointly in the name of a unified NATO program, it would be infeasible, in practice, to avoid creating separate nuclear capabilities.

Public discussion of multinational nuclear sharing in legislatures and the press has related chiefly to the matter of who pulls the trigger and the safety catch -- that is, which ally or allies decides whether to use or not use nuclear weapons. But there are other kinds of control to be shared or not shared. Some proposals for sharing are concerned merely with extending the multinational operation, manning, and command of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Buchan, in his Foreign Affairs article, abandoned his previous proposal (set forth in NATO In The 1960's) for decision-sharing and proposed, instead, meeting the political problems of nuclear control by enlarging allied participation in and information about strategic planning. Sharing the political decisions that might govern the use of nuclear weapons in combat has not yet become an issue, since only recently have strategic thinkers and planners -- and almost all of these are in the United States -- begun to take seriously the prospect of fighting a politically-controlled nuclear war, and since those who have taken the prospect seriously are impressed with the immense difficulties of achieving effective political control of nuclear warfare nationally, let alone multinationally.

The crucial question in considering ways to enlarge the allies' share in the control of nuclear weapons is whether the purposes of sharing require joint participation in the decision to use nuclear weapons or whether they can be served better by sharing the less sensitive components of control; for decision-sharing (beyond mere consultation) raises extraordinarily difficult problems of multinational collaboration. The answer to this question depends heavily on the views of the key NATO governments -- American, German, French, and British -- toward the existing system of control, on their present fears and ambitions in the nuclear realm, and on how they would react to alternative systems. It also depends heavily on the extent of their agreement or disagreement on the contingencies and methods of nuclear warfare. My own comprehension of these two rather imponderable factors leads to the following conclusions.

All the major allies, and the German Federal Republic in particular, would welcome any arrangement that would give them greater influence in shaping strategic plans for the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe and more information about the nature of these plans. But whether or not this would help assure the allies that nuclear weapons would be used in a manner compatible with their vital interests would depend on the success of the United States in using these modes of sharing to persuade them to meet the pressing need for a strategic revision that will reduce NATO's dependence on countering conventional aggressions with nuclear warfare. The German government feels the need of this assurance most keenly. The United States would be in a better position to provide it while undertaking the delicate task of reducing German dependence on a first-strike nuclear strategy if Germany were a participant in a military planning and surveillance body of a command to which the United States had firmly committed external as

well as European based nuclear forces adequate to serve the real military needs of deterrence and defence. Only by sharing more of the information and responsibilities that have impelled her own revision of the massive-retaliation posture can the United States help educate her allies to support a more flexible strategy free from the present convenient but paralyzing dependence on nuclear weapons.

Compared to sharing planning and information, sharing the operation of nuclear weapons, as through multinational seaborne crews or land-based teams (even assuming that they could be selected and trained to operate smoothly) would seem to be relatively ineffective as an instrument of assurance and education, since, by itself, this kind of participation would not provide allies with much information about the strategic plans for using nuclear weapons. Chiefly, it would provide them with a kind of symbolic participation. It would not give them any more influence on the decision to pull the nuclear trigger, unless the national elements were in a position to fire the missiles against the commander's orders, which is quite improbable, or to prevent the commander from firing when he gave the order, which is more likely. But in either of these cases, multinational crews and teams would be administratively and politically disruptive, since to the extent they were actually used to enhance national influence they would threaten to bring about unauthorized decision-sharing at the operational level. Multinational manning would be useful, principally, to give allies surveillance over the proper execution of decisions shared at the political level.

The allies have already had successful experience in command-sharing. The extension of subordinate non-American allied commands over nuclear-capable forces would be valuable as a means of manifesting their international character, but the assurance and

education such commands foster will be proportionate to the real influence over operations and plans that they provide allied governments, and in the absence of decision-sharing this influence should be limited by the requirements of effective American custody and decision-making authority. One must recognize, however, that sharing the command of nuclear weapons would enable allies to veto an American decision to use the weapons under their command, even though American custody of the warheads would prevent them from using the weapons in the absence of an American decision.

Sharing the planning process would seem to be the most fruitful way to enhance the cohesion and security of NATO. Yet one must concede that no kind of sharing however valuable short of decision-sharing, it may be in the short run, is likely to solve the problems created by existing and prospective independent nuclear efforts. For the French government, especially under de Gaulle, will not regard any participation in the operation and planning processes as compensation for relinquishing an independent nuclear effort, to which it is committed as a matter of national prestige and diplomatic weight, even aside from considerations of military security. And as long as France remains determined to become an independent nuclear power, it will be difficult for the British to abandon their nuclear program and for the Germans to refrain from seeking one. In the long run, if there is any alternative to several independent allied nuclear efforts, it will probably have to be a system of control that grants the key allies a share in the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons; for, ultimately, this is the only kind of sharing that might come close to providing allies who are nuclear possessors or aspirants with a measure of nuclear control comparable to what they believe they might obtain by an independent effort.

Yet nuclear decision-sharing at any time will incur grave political difficulties, and under the present circumstances these difficulties virtually preclude the allies agreeing on the organization and procedures of such sharing. For, given the present dependence of the allies on a nuclear response to aggression, and given the strategic (not to mention political) differences among them, the same apprehensions that make some allies uneasy about America's exclusive control of nuclear weapons would make all allies considerably more uneasy about sharing that decision among themselves, whether on a NATO-wide basis or within a special grouping of allies. With the possible exception of de Gaulle, who looks forward to a Little European nuclear force under French leadership, allied governments would rather depend on America's decision to use nuclear weapons, or share that decision bilaterally with her, than depend on the decisions of other allies, whether with or without the United States participation. For there is now -- although the situation is by no means immutable -- a closer identity of vital interests between the United States and her allies than between any one ally and the others; and, despite the growing economic strength of the Continental European allies, the United States is still regarded as the pre-eminent power in the alliance with a unique interest and experience in representing the collective security of the allies.

Thus, although several allies might want bilateral decision-sharing with the United States for themselves, few would be willing to extend the same privilege to others. And although the German government might be willing to see some form of bilateral decision-sharing applied to all the allies, other allies would not accept such a large German share in decision-making, even if they welcomed it for themselves. In any decision-sharing arrangement that might now be established, the major allies would demand a finger

on the safety catch -- that is, a veto on every other ally's decision to use nuclear weapons. Yet the allies who might want access to the trigger are opposed to giving fifteen allies access to the safety catch. For this would nullify any advantage they might have gained through increasing their power to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and it would create such a cumbersome mechanism as to be virtually incapable of initiating the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance. Only some multi-lateral decision-sharing group short of the fifteen allies might be acceptable to the major allies; but it is not likely that Britain, France, and Germany, under present circumstances, would prefer sharing the decision with or without the United States in a group to depending upon the United States alone.

The crux of the problem of decision-sharing is that a militarily effective and politically acceptable arrangement requires a very solid political and strategic consensus among the participants. That consensus does not now exist. Hence, to throw the matter of decision-making open to active discussion now would be immediately disruptive without being constructive in the end. The first priority, therefore, must be assigned to less far-reaching modes of sharing, which, without placing such heavy demands upon national collaboration, may facilitate the development of the kind of strategic and political consensus that might some day make decision-sharing practicable.

7. Sharing Strategic Planning

What kind of sharing, then, should the United States encourage at the outset? The United States can make a cautious beginning toward broader allied participation in nuclear control by sharing some kinds of information about American nuclear plans and about the data and considerations upon which they are based.

She might also actively seek allied cooperation in formulating general guidelines for the American government on the contingencies and methods of using nuclear weapons, particularly as applied to the situations in which the President would not have time to consult with allied governments. But the most important kind of sharing the United States can foster in the immediate future is that which would give the allies greater participation in planning the use of all the nuclear weapons required for the defense of Europe.

The communique issued after the May, 1962, meeting of NATO ministers indicated that the allies have agreed upon "special procedures" in all these areas. A further extension of sharing would seem to require organizational as well as procedural innovations. For example, sharing the planning process, as well as the information upon which it is based, could be served by revitalizing the Standing Group in order to enhance its role as a general staff, as the locus of overall military planning in which the chief military representatives of allied governments would concert their plans for the strategy and tactics of employing nuclear and conventional forces. This role has, in fact, been largely performed by the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), which was supposed to be purely an operational command. SHAPE, however, is so largely an American-dominated body and at the same time so independent of the American policy-making process, that it does not give its allied members and subordinate commanders either the active participation in the military planning process or the familiarity with the American government's planning that a more broadly representative allied general staff might provide. Yet the Military Committee and its Standing Group have not had the organization, staff, or representation to make them truly NATO's highest military authorities, providing overall strategic guidance.

There are a number of ways in which the Standing Group might be revitalized as a general military planning body. For one thing, it might be given an international staff that is at least comparable in quantity and quality to SHAPE's. For another, the German Federal Republic (and perhaps another ally on a rotating basis) might join the United States, Britain, and France, as a member of the top planning echelon. In addition, the Standing Group ought to be headed by a single civilian -- say, a Deputy-Secretary-General -- who, as a militarily knowledgeable individual, could, somewhat like a strong American Secretary of Defense, help concert plans and transmit the results to the highest civilian authorities in the North Atlantic Council, thereby enhancing the role of the Standing Group through some of the methods of personal leadership that General Norstad has so ably employed in representing SHAPE.

The vital civil-military link in allied planning might be further strengthened by moving the Standing Group to Paris, where there could be the same kind of ready and continuous communication with the Council that SHAPE enjoys now. But, in addition, the Council would have to be equipped, as it is not now, to make expert appraisals of military plans in their full political context; and this means that it must at least have the expert military advice it presently lacks. This advice might be provided by disbanding the permanent representatives of the military committee and either absorbing them into the national delegations or establishing them as a Committee of Military Advisors in the Council.

With some such reorganization of NATO's central civil-military institutions to enhance allied participation in NATO's military planning process, SHAPE could become more like an operational command and less like a general staff. To assure the allies that

adequate numbers of nuclear weapons would always be available to respond to military threats in Europe, the United States should permanently assign to NATO elements of SAC and of U.S. seaborne missiles, in addition to the remaining land-based war heads and delivery vehicles in Europe. There would then be a military and organizational basis for the allies to participate in a truly coordinated, secure, and tightly controlled nuclear force, which would meet their real military needs.

The SAC and European-based weapons and, preferably, for the sake of unified command, the seaborne missiles should be under the command of SACEUR, who, more than any other commander, has the stature of an international officer and the confidence of the European allies. In the future, however, as the allies acquired experience in operating their assigned or earmarked nuclear-capable forces under this joint command and as conventional capabilities became adequate, it might be advisable, in order to emphasize the special function of nuclear weapons and facilitate effective central command and control, to create a nuclear command (SACNUC or SACDET, as in Buchan's original proposal) under an American commander, separate from SACEUR (who might then be a European).

But would any of these organizational changes forestall the proliferation of separate allied nuclear forces? No reorganization of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO, short of decision-sharing (and probably not that) is likely to dissuade France from pursuing an independent nuclear effort. It might, however, blunt the military incentives for such an effort and make it more likely that whatever nuclear contingents she developed would be coordinated, in training and combat, within a central command, if only to the extent that allied naval units are coordinated

under SACLANT. Perhaps France's assignment of her nuclear delivery vehicles to a NATO command using French as well as other European bases could be assured if the United States would assist her in acquiring an independent nuclear force, even though the United States retained exclusive decision-making authority and custody of the warheads within this command; but that would defeat the political and military purposes of sharing. It is one thing for the United States to acquiesce in the French achievement of a nuclear force while avowing its futility and quite another thing for the United States to assist this development; for the latter course, by appearing to endorse the French case, would make it all the more difficult for the West German government to abstain from nuclear development and for the United States to refrain from helping.

In the foreseeable future, probably the best that can be expected from sharing the components of control short of the decision to use nuclear weapons is that France and Britain, along with the non-nuclear allies, will collaborate in the operation and strategic planning of an integrated nuclear force, which they recognize as the only effective military force practicable, while they content themselves with token national nuclear forces, which they recognize as largely symbols of prestige and claims to a voice in disarmament conferences.

8. Nuclear Decision-Sharing

In the next few years, extending allied participation in and information about planning for the use of nuclear weapons, in conjunction with a revision of NATO's military strategy and capabilities to reduce allied dependence upon initiating the use of nuclear weapons in combat, may give West Germany and other allies sufficient assurance concerning the United

States use of nuclear weapons to prevent the issue of nuclear control from becoming a serious threat to allied political and military cooperation. In the long run, however, the major allies are not likely to be satisfied with a system of nuclear control that leaves the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons exclusively in American hands. Once explicitly acknowledged and acted upon, the logic of sharing some components of nuclear control is likely to extend to sharing the most crucial component. The growing economic strength and political self-consciousness of the European allies and the growing awareness of European and American vulnerability to devastation by Soviet nuclear power will reinforce this logic. As the allies represented on a revitalized Standing Group obtained greater familiarity with the detailed problems of nuclear planning, they would naturally seek more influence over the execution as well as the formulation of nuclear plans. Their claims for a share in the execution of nuclear plans will, in any case, be enhanced by their growing dependence upon nuclear forces based outside Europe. Furthermore, if it becomes technically and economically easier for some allies to build useful nuclear forces -- which seems likely in the 1970's -- this will increase the urgency of actively exploring decision-sharing as an alternative to the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities. Thus extension of allied sharing in the strategic planning process cannot be expected to forestall the issue of decision-sharing indefinitely, but it could make decision-sharing more feasible -- providing that it succeeded in consolidating an allied consensus on military policies that did not depend heavily, if at all, on countering conventional aggressions with nuclear warfare.

Of course, a workable organization of decision-sharing will depend on more than a strategic consensus. It will depend on an accommodation of the

great political differences among the allies in which the issues of nuclear control and military strategy have become entangled. Perhaps it will even depend on a form of federal government capable of formulating strategy and foreign policy centrally. If so, we can rule out nuclear decision-sharing for at least the next quarter century, since there are no signs that the NATO allies or any group of them is going to develop the kind of identity of interests and policies that such a federation must presuppose. In reality, however, workable decision-sharing is probably more difficult to envision in theory than to achieve in practice, since, given a sufficient strategic consensus, its encroachment upon national sovereignty will be tempered by advance agreement upon a quite restricted and, indeed, improbable set of practical choices. So we may at least assume, in the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary, that the allies may agree on a method of nuclear decision-sharing even though they will not agree to federate.

The precise organization of decision-sharing must depend on the various avenues of allied collaboration that may have opened up through experience with lesser forms of sharing by the time decision-sharing becomes a subject of active negotiation. These avenues are difficult to anticipate, but it seems likely that the organization for decision-sharing would be an outgrowth of the revitalized Standing Group and its national civilian counterparts in the North Atlantic Council. Some such high civil-military group (let us call it the NATO Security Council), which was accustomed to collaborating in the nuclear planning process, would be the natural locus of decisions to execute nuclear plans.

But by what procedure would such a body make decisions to use or not use nuclear weapons? A workable yet politically acceptable procedure is even more

difficult to anticipate than the form of organization. A workable procedure will require a certain centralization of authority, but a politically acceptable procedure will require a minimal subordination of national sovereignty. The fine balance between these two qualities must depend on some important imponderables, such as the prestige and influence of an authority who might direct and coordinate decision-making and the degree of political and strategic consensus among the decision-makers.

Perhaps the Secretary-General or a Deputy Secretary-General will attain the stature and command the confidence to act as the executive agent of the NATO Security Council. If so, the Security Council might give him advance authorization to order proportionate nuclear retaliation against a nuclear attack in Europe. But probably it would not be politically wise or feasible for the Security Council to authorize him to order the initial use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict except after gaining the unanimous consent of that body's representatives. This requirement of unanimity should not weaken nuclear deterrence or cause allied dissension under the pressure of a crisis, if NATO could resist a major conventional aggression without resorting to nuclear war and if there were a firm political and strategic consensus among the decision-makers, applicable to the particular conflict in question. If these two conditions do not exist, it is hard to imagine any system of nuclear decision-making, including one dominated by the United States, that would avoid serious military and political liabilities. To the extent that allied security depends on meeting conventional aggressions with nuclear blows, the United States will undermine the credibility of this recourse by sharing the decision to put it into effect. Yet to the extent the European allies have to base their security upon an American decision of this fateful

nature, the United States will find it difficult to sustain the kind of political cohesion with and among her allies that will enable the West to meet Soviet "nuclear blackmail" with a common resolve.

The fundamental political requirement in devising a system of multinational nuclear decision-making is that the organization of the sharers and the procedure for sharing should accurately reflect the actual configurations of power, consensus, and responsibility within the alliance. If the United States exclusive control of the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons is more compatible with these configurations than any system of shared control in which the United States were more nearly an equal participant, it would be foolish to encourage a wider dispersion of nuclear responsibilities merely to satisfy an abstract fondness for sharing or to create a facade of integration. On the other hand, if the European allies should develop among themselves and separately from the United States a strategic and political consensus, together with the requisite power and responsibility, that could provide a firmer basis for decision-sharing than any grouping that included the United States -- something that is not likely to happen but which cannot be ruled out -- it would be unwise for the United States to resist an integrated, independent control of nuclear weapons by the European allies. It would be far better to accede to this development and try to mesh a European-controlled force with America's than to resist this development at the great political and military price of seeing two or, perhaps, three or four unintegrated nuclear forces established. Yet, by the same token, it would be equally unwise for the United States to encourage such European independence if there were no evidence of a sound political and military basis for it, simply in deference to the ideal of "European unity"; for that course would loosen the crucial

entanglement of the United States with her allies without creating a substantial substitute in intra-European ties.

The same principles should govern the multinational sharing of decisions to control the use of nuclear weapons in combat; but, in practice, sharing this kind of decision is a much more difficult undertaking. For this kind of nuclear control puts a premium upon continual, quick, centralized decisions, which would be no less politically sensitive than the original decision to use nuclear weapons. The controlled and graduated employment of nuclear blows -- an enormous problem of military coordination and political responsiveness under the best conditions -- will be extremely difficult for the United States itself to manage. The multinational management of a controlled nuclear war really presupposes a degree of political as well as military integration that no group of allies will attain in the foreseeable future. Yet it is hard to envision the allies sharing the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons without also sharing the decisions to control their use in combat. Consequently, the possible advantages of sharing the first component of nuclear control should be weighed against the certain difficulties of sharing the second.

9. The Prospect

In short, there is no escaping the complicated, intractable nature of the problem of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO, for this is a delicate issue of inter-allied politics, as well as an exacting problem of military policy. Hence, we must approach it with all the sensitivity, flexibility, and pragmatism of the accomplished diplomat, as well as with the analytical rigor and esoteric knowledge of the military expert. Only the highest order of modern military statecraft can cope with an issue that combines

the most troublesome features of the military and political realms. But this is also an issue that calls for a high order of foresight, innovation, and leadership, for it is probably both too complex and too consequential to work itself out through the fine adjustments of national policies which ordinarily cope with the routine problems of statecraft.

Yet the natural tendency of this pluralistic government, when confronted with an issue of this complexity, will be to change the status quo as little as possible, to satisfy the tactical requirements of the existing situation and defer all the difficult decisions. As the exchange of ideas within the government resolves itself into the lowest common denominator through countless cables, memoranda, and position papers, the tendency will be to do nothing more than seems to be compelled by the vicissitudes of external events. Hence, policy is likely to become merely the reflex of immediate pressures, which are themselves blunted by the same process of bargaining and compromise among allied governments seeking the course of least resistance.

It would not be surprising, therefore, that even if the allies should pass the point of exploration and reach the point of serious negotiation and decision concerning the control of nuclear weapons -- a point that was not reached in the spring of 1962 -- all sense of urgency would have been wrung out of the issue and everyone would be happy to settle for a reaffirmation of America's determination to defend her allies by all appropriate means, another resolution to share certain kinds of information and consult on certain kinds of nuclear decisions, some symbolic gesture of allied participation, and an agreement to study the whole matter for consideration at a future conference. For it would be argued that nobody except the Germans is really much interested in sharing nuclear

responsibilities; that the Germans, after all, are not going to insist upon any kind of nuclear sharing at the expense of allied harmony and support (indeed, even before the Athens meeting in May, 1962, German spokesmen had dropped their request for a NATO nuclear force and were asking only for certain information, guarantees, and consultation); that there is no imminent prospect of Germany or any other ally launching an independent nuclear effort; that the French are encountering immense financial obstacles in carrying out their own nuclear ambitions but are neither going to quit the alliance nor organize a Little Europe (if only because no one will join them); and that, no matter what decisions the allies take or fail to take, the Russians are not going to launch an invasion of Europe, however obstreperous they may become in Berlin.

Yet if the United States is thus content to muddle through indefinitely, joining her allies in seeking the course of least resistance, she may miss one of those critical moments when indispensable initiatives might be taken to move the alliance toward a revision of its security posture and its internal terms of collaboration, a revision which might save it from military emasculation and political paralysis in the troubled years ahead. The United States can never reform the alliance single-handedly, but she can probably exert more influence upon it now, when her military preponderance in the alliance is still unchallenged and the political realignments in Europe are still formative, than she will be able to exert later, when some allies may have become irrevocably committed to military and political courses that are only a worried conjecture within the American government now.

The American government will achieve a great deal, however minimal the extension of nuclear

sharing may be, if it persuades the allies that the technical and economic requirements of a highly integrated, militarily useful nuclear force are immense; that a useful independent nuclear force is therefore impractical; that America's nuclear capability is militarily adequate for their defense; and that the prior and urgent allied military objective should be to build up NATO's capacity to withstand conventional aggression without resorting to nuclear war. This would at least enable the allies to distinguish more clearly NATO's military from its political requirements in the nuclear realm. Yet in the long run the cohesion of the alliance will depend on something more than an effort to make the allies content with the military adequacy of America's monopolistic control of nuclear power. It will depend on a sharing of nuclear responsibilities commensurate with the political need of strong and self-confident allies to control the conditions of their own survival.

Sooner or later, there must be some devolution of nuclear responsibilities. The real question is whether it will take place on a multilateral basis within NATO, through collaboration of the United States with an Anglo-Franco-German nucleus (sometimes called the "dumbbell" concept), through the crystallization of an Anglo-American and a Franco-German axis, or in the form of several independently-controlled national nuclear forces. Each of these alternatives would have distinct military and political consequences. Only the first two are compatible with American interests, most American observers would agree. The United States may have to make a choice between them, if only to prevent a drift toward the latter two alternatives.

I see no compelling reason to prefer the dumbbell to the integrated NATO configuration of nuclear control if the latter will command sufficient nuclear

coordination, non-nuclear collaboration, and political cooperation among the allies while blunting the incentives for independent nuclear efforts; for I believe that America's vital interests would be better served by an integrated nuclear force, even if the United States did not have unilateral control of the decision to use it, than by collaborating with an independently-controlled nuclear force, the chief military function of which would be to act as a trigger on America's nuclear force. Possibly, with the rise of Chinese nuclear power the United States might become so heavily involved in maintaining the balance of nuclear power outside Europe that it could not also maintain the nuclear balance against an attack in Europe, but even then a separate European nuclear force would be valuable only if it could really relieve the United States of its European nuclear responsibilities and not merely act as a trigger to involve her. This seems doubtful without massive American assistance. Moreover, the United States could not be expected to assist her European allies in becoming an independent nuclear power unless they also took over the full responsibilities of managing the non-nuclear shield.

It is argued in some quarters that America's interest in a strong Western Europe demands the creation of a united, more independent European group of powers, growing out of the common economic interests already embodied in the evolving European Economic Community; and that this group must have independent military strength, including nuclear weapons, in order to become a viable political force. But where is the evidence that the prospective members of a united Europe have the political solidarity to concert foreign and military policies as an independent group? Do they not enjoy more solidarity in close military entanglement with the United States than they could muster by themselves? In any case,

it seems doubtful that they would have the collective will, even if they could eventually develop the collective capacity, to become a genuinely independent military force in the whole spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities needed to keep the balance of power in Europe. Nevertheless, it may develop that a European economic consortium will insist upon military independence from the United States. If so, the United States will have to adjust to the development when it arises. But, meanwhile, she would be wiser to pursue a policy of consolidating her military entanglement with Europe rather than loosening it.

The chief argument for a European nuclear force, in my view, is that it might be the only feasible way to accommodate a virtually inevitable devolution of nuclear responsibility by means other than a Franco-German nuclear axis or four or five independently-controlled allied nuclear forces. This might be the situation if the allies were dissatisfied with any form of nuclear sharing that left the United States with military hegemony, yet unable to reach a satisfactory NATO-wide sharing of control without such hegemony. It might be the situation if Britain's joining the Common Market would lead to irresistible pressures upon her to end her special nuclear relationship with the United States and extend nuclear assistance to her European partners. Yet I do not think that, even in these circumstances, a European nuclear force is sufficiently likely to be an alternative to the multiplication of national nuclear forces to warrant forfeiting an attempt to satisfy allied interests within the present NATO framework, with the United States holding the nuclear decision-making power until the allies can agree on a workable method of sharing it.

On the other hand, one of the serious dangers in encouraging the dumbbell configuration is that it would produce, in fact if not in form, a fourth separate

allied nuclear force (West Germany's) instead of one unified three-power force. For it is difficult to foresee France, Britain, and West Germany perceiving and translating into policy the identity of vital interests that would enable them to delegate nuclear decision-making to either a single authority among them or a tri-national control organ. Only the present French government appears to see its interests as lying in the development of a tight European military and political alliance in looser attachment to the United States. Yet, although the pressure for a nuclear Third Force comes from de Gaulle, he wants to share the production, not the use, of nuclear weapons. His often-expounded conception of national cooperation as opposed to supranational integration (which he considers a particularly unrealistic and pernicious notion in defense and foreign policies) is diametrically opposed to multilateral sharing of the decision to use nuclear weapons and to delegating this sovereign power to anyone but a Frenchman.

I conclude that the best way to mitigate the present American nuclear dominance in NATO in response to the compelling tendency toward the dispersion of nuclear responsibility is to extend allied participation in nuclear control -- hopefully, short of sharing nuclear custody and decision-making -- within the existing NATO framework. Then we shall have to count on America's political sagacity and upon allied self-education in the military realities to forestall the development of separate nuclear forces or, failing that, to confine these forces to tokens of national prestige and diplomatic influence, no more disturbing to allied cohesion than the present devalued British nuclear force -- and less adverse to collective non-nuclear necessities.

